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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine whether shareholders of acquiring firms gain when firms announce 
acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and subsidiaries. We consider these different types of 
acquisitions together since corporations acquiring a public firm, a private firm, or a subsidiary 
could be acquiring similar assets.
1 Typically, such purchases are large investments for the firms 
that undertake them. We form a sample of all such purchases for more than $1 million by public 
firms recorded by SDC from 1980 to 2001. For our sample of 12,023 acquisitions, the average 
announcement return for acquiring firm shareholders is 1.1%, representing a gain of $5.80 per 
$100 spent on acquisitions. Assuming that the capital markets have an unbiased assessment of the 
gains from acquisitions, this gain corresponds to the economic benefit of the acquisition for the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm together with other information released or inferred by 
investors when firms make acquisition announcements.  
The average gain on acquisitions provides an incomplete, perhaps even deceiving, picture of 
the impact of acquisitions on shareholder wealth. Over our sample period, the sample firms spent 
roughly $3 trillion on acquisitions. The announcement of these acquisitions cost the shareholders 
of these firms a total of $218 billion dollars. Acquisitions by small firms are profitable, but these 
firms make small acquisitions with small dollar gains. Large firms make large acquisitions that 
result in large dollar losses. Acquisitions make losses for shareholders in the aggregate because 
the losses made by large firms are much larger than the gains made by small firms. Roughly, 
shareholders from small firms earn $8 billion from the acquisitions they made from 1980 to 2001, 
whereas the shareholders from large firms lose $226 billion. Shareholders would have made 
aggregate losses ignoring the latest merger wave, but the latest merger wave contributes 
overwhelmingly to the total amount spent on acquisitions and to the dollar amount of losses.  
                                                      
1 Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) have a sample of 282 large acquisitions. They find that almost 44% of the 
acquisitions are subsequently divested. 216 of their acquisitions were acquisitions of public companies. The 
acquired assets were then spun off in some cases and acquired by other companies in most cases. Hence, in 
their sample, the same assets most likely were first acquired as a public firm acquisition and then as a 
division acquisition in the divestiture.   2 
 
Roughly, one quarter of the firms acquiring public firms are small firms whereas half of the 
firms acquiring private firms are small firms. The small firms that acquire public firms on average 
increase shareholder wealth doing so; the large firms do not. Whether an acquiring firm is a small 
firm explains more of the return to shareholders than how the acquisition is paid for and at least 
as much as whether a public company, a private company, or a subsidiary is acquired. An 
acquisition made by a small firm, regardless of form of payment and regardless of the 
organizational form of the assets acquired, has an announcement return that is 2.24% higher than 
a comparable acquisition made by a large firm. In contrast, acquisitions of public firms made by 
large firms make losses for the shareholders of the acquiring firm irrespective of how they are 
paid for.  
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) show that for a sample of firms that make five or more 
acquisitions in the 1990s the returns to acquiring firm shareholders differ across organizational 
form of the acquired assets. In our sample of acquisitions through the 1980s and 1990s, we find 
that the shareholders of the acquiring firm gain the most when the firm acquires a subsidiary or a 
private firm. The announcement abnormal return for the acquisition of a subsidiary is 2%. In 
contrast, the acquiring firm shareholders gain 1.5% when a private firm is acquired and lose 1% 
when a public firm is acquired. However, the only acquisitions that have positive aggregate dollar 
gains for shareholders are acquisitions of subsidiaries. 
The literature has identified many determinants of bidder returns. Much evidence has been 
produced showing a sharp difference in bidder returns between acquisitions of public targets paid 
for with cash and acquisitions of public targets paid for with equity.
2 Fuller et al. (2002) and 
Chang (1998) show that these differences do not extend to acquisitions of private firms. Fuller et 
al. (2002) find that acquisitions of private firms paid for with equity have a positive abnormal 
return in their sample.  
                                                      
2 See Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) for recent evidence and review of the literature.    3 
 
We find in our sample that the difference in acquirer abnormal returns across organizational 
form of acquired assets is dramatic for equity offers. The announcement return for acquisitions of 
private firms and subsidiaries paid for with equity is, respectively, 3.51% and 4.74% higher than 
the announcement return for the acquisition of public firms. The announcement return is 0.85% 
higher for private firm cash acquisitions and 1.33% higher for subsidiary cash acquisitions than 
for cash acquisitions of public firms. After controlling for deal and firm characteristics, there is 
no significant difference for cash offers between acquisitions of private firms, public firms, and 
subsidiaries. Our results create difficulties for a common explanation of the negative return of 
bidders, namely the fact that the bidder’s decision to pay with equity reveals that bidder 
management believes that the equity is overpriced. If this were the explanation, there would be no 
reason for the difference between abnormal returns of large bidders and small bidders. However, 
we find evidence indicating that the impact of short-sales by arbitrageurs identified by Mitchell, 
Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) may explain part of the announcement return for large bidders.   
Acquisition announcement returns might convey information unrelated to the merger itself. 
For instance, it could be that the market learns from a merger announcement both that a firm is 
making a specific acquisition that might be better or worse than expected and that the firm has 
fewer internal growth opportunities than expected. In this case, a merger that is a positive net 
present value project for the firm might be associated with a negative announcement return.
3 The 
negative announcement return would not be evidence that the merger reduces the wealth of the 
bidder’s shareholders. Strikingly, however, even if the abnormal returns incorporate other 
information than an estimate of the net present value of the acquisition, this information differs 
across small and large firms and that difference is of first-order importance in understanding the 
abnormal returns. Small firms make acquisitions that, when announced, have an abnormal return 
that is systematically higher than acquisitions by large firms and acquisitions of public firms by 
                                                      
3 Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) provide a formal model where an acquisition announcement has a 
negative abnormal return for the acquiring firm even though the acquisition is a positive net present value 
project for the firm.    4 
 
large firms are accompanied by significant negative abnormal returns regardless of how they are 
financed.  
It is possible that the market does not correctly anticipate the benefits and costs of 
acquisitions for acquiring-firm shareholders. This could be because subsequent events affect the 
value of acquisitions or because, for whatever reason, the market has a biased assessment of the 
value of the acquisitions. We therefore investigate the long-run stock performance of acquiring 
firms to examine this issue.  
The paper is organized as follows. We describe our sample and the characteristics of sample 
firms in Section 2. In Section 3, we document that shareholders from acquiring firms gain when 
acquisitions are announced. We show how abnormal returns differ according to the organizational 
form of the acquired assets, the method of payment, and firm size. In Section 4, we demonstrate 
how some of these differences can be understood when we control for deal and firm 
characteristics. In Section 5, we consider the long-term returns following acquisition 
announcements. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. The sample of acquisitions. 
The sample of acquisitions comes from the Securities Data Company's (SDC) U.S. Mergers 
and Acquisitions Database. We select the sample of domestic mergers and acquisitions with 
announcement dates between 1980 and 2001. We consider only acquisitions where acquiring 
firms end up with all of the shares of the acquired firm or subsidiary. We do not want to consider 
acquisitions where the acquiring firm already has control of the acquired assets, so we require the 
acquiring firm to control less than 50% of the shares of the acquired firm before the 
announcement. We further require that (1) the transaction is completed, (2) the deal value is 
greater than $1 million, (3) a public or private U.S. firm or a non-public subsidiary of a public or 
private firm are acquired, and (4) the acquirer is a public firm listed on CRSP and Compustat 
during the event window. After collecting these acquisitions, we eliminate those where the 
relative transaction size is less than one percent. We define the relative transaction size as the   5 
 
total value of the consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses as reported by 
SDC, relative to the market value of assets of the acquirer. We also require that the number of 
days between announcement and completion dates is less than one thousand.  
Our requirements yield a sample of 12,023 transactions. Almost half of the sample involves 
acquisitions of private firms (5,583). There are also more subsidiary acquisitions (3,798) than 
acquisitions of public firms (2,642). Table 1 shows the number of acquisitions by year. The 
number of acquisitions does not increase monotonically through time: it falls in 1990 and in 
recent years. The number of acquisitions in the 1990s is dramatically larger than in the 1980s. In 
our tests, we will often use time dummy variables to take into account these changes. In a given 
year, the sample typically has more acquisitions of private firms than public firms and has more 
acquisitions of subsidiaries than public firms. In the 1990s, there are more acquisitions of private 
firms than subsidiaries, but in the 1980s, there are years with more acquisitions of subsidiaries 
than of private firms.  
Table 2 provides information for deal and firm characteristics for our sample. We organize 
this information according to the organizational form of the assets acquired. In the first row, we 
show that the dollar value of acquisitions is much larger for acquisitions of public firms than for 
private firms, while the dollar value of acquisitions of subsidiaries are in between the two. Even 
as a fraction of the assets of the acquirer, acquisitions of public firms are fifty percent larger than 
acquisitions of private firms. We then report days to completion. Not surprisingly, it takes longer 
to complete an acquisition of a public firm than it takes to complete the acquisition of a private 
firm or subsidiary. To estimate whether a particular acquisition takes place in an active merger 
and acquisition market, we use the measure of asset liquidity developed in Schlingemann, Stulz, 
and Walkling (2002). This measure is defined as the value of deals divided by the book value of 
the 2-digit SIC code industry assets. We find that the private firm acquisitions take place in a 
market with a higher liquidity index than the other acquisitions. Cash is used more frequently to 
pay for acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries than in acquisitions of public firms. Not 
surprisingly, almost no acquisitions of private firms or subsidiaries involve a tender offer or are   6 
 
part of a hostile deal. We define a transaction as diversifying if the target and the acquirer have 
different two-digit SIC codes (using the SIC codes reported by SDC). Acquisitions of private 
firms and subsidiaries are more likely to be diversifying acquisitions than acquisitions of public 
firms. We would expect competition for a target to decrease the return to the acquirer. We 
construct a proxy for competition, where competed deals are deals with multiple firms that make 
a public bid. With this measure, competition is rare in acquisitions of public firms, but almost 
non-existent for acquisitions of private firms or subsidiaries. However, our measure suffers from 
the fact that there may be multiple potential acquirers, but the competition among them is 
resolved privately. Boone and Mulherin (2002) show that, in the 1990s, an acquisition by one 
public bidder may follow a private auction in which many firms participate. In such a situation 
our measure of competition would indicate no competition, even though there would have been 
strong competition in the private auction.  
In panel B of Table 2, characteristics of the acquiring firm are detailed. In the first row, we 
show that firms acquiring private firms have more liquid assets as a proportion of total assets than 
firms acquiring public firms. The book value of assets is much smaller for firms that make private 
firm and subsidiary acquisitions than for firms that make public firm acquisitions. The same is 
true for market capitalization. Firms that make private firm acquisitions have lower leverage than 
firms that make public firm acquisitions, but not dramatically so. We compute a proxy for 
Tobin’s q where we use the book value of debt plus the market value of equity in the numerator 
and the book value of assets in the denominator. The q of firms making private firm acquisitions 
is much higher than the q of other firms making acquisitions. Firms making private acquisitions 
have lower operating cash flow. We define an acquirer to be a small firm if in the year of the 
acquisition the acquirer’s market capitalization is below the 25
th percentile of firms listed on the 
NYSE. We see from the last row of the table that the percentage of acquisitions made by small 
firms is higher for acquisitions of private firms and dramatically lower for acquisitions of public 
firms.    7 
 
 
3. The gains to acquiring firm shareholders. 
 
We estimate the gains to shareholders of acquiring firms in three ways: 
 
1)  Abnormal return over the three days around the announcement for each 
transaction.  To estimate that abnormal return, we use standard event study 
methodology, following Brown and Warner (1985). Abnormal returns are calculated 
using market model benchmark returns with the CRSP equally weighted index returns. 
The parameters for the market model are estimated over the (−205, −6) day interval, 
and the p-values are estimated using the time-series and cross-sectional variation of 
abnormal returns.
4 As pointed out by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), the 
three-day window is one of the two most commonly used event windows for merger 
studies. The other window most commonly used starts before the announcement and 
ends with the completion of the merger. The longer window makes it possible to take 
into account bid revisions and other actions taken by the bidder in reaction to 
defensive actions taken by the target (see Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Schwert 
(2000)) and to competition. The advantage of the shorter window is that its results are 
typically insensitive to the model chosen for expected returns.   
2)  Gain to shareholders per dollar spent on the acquisition over the three-day 
announcement window.  We call this measure the percentage net present value of the 
acquisition. The advantage of this second measure is that it more directly estimates the 
profitability of the investment made by the acquiring firm. A given acquisition could 
be associated with vastly different abnormal returns if undertaken by different firms 
simply because the acquiring firms differ in size. In contrast, if the change in the value   8 
 
of the acquirer’s shares measures the gain to the acquiring firm’s shareholders from 
the acquisition, an acquisition will have the same percentage net present value 
regardless of the size of the acquiring firm. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) 
introduced the percentage net present value, but they used the gross change in the 
value of the acquirer’s equity to estimate it. In contrast, we compute the numerator 
using the approach proposed by Malatesta (1983) to compute the dollar abnormal 
return. We subtract from the gross change in the value of the acquirer’s equity the 
predicted change from the market model. This gives us the dollar abnormal change in 
the value of the acquirer, or what Malatesta (1983) calls the dollar abnormal return. 
We then divide the dollar abnormal return by the total value of the transaction as 
reported by SDC to obtain the percentage net present value of the transaction.  
3)  Aggregate net present value from acquisitions over the three-day announcement 
window. This measure represents the sum of the dollar net present value of all the 
acquisitions in our sample and is defined as the sum of the dollar abnormal returns. It 
tells us how much wealth was created for acquiring firm shareholders for the sample 
of acquisitions announced from 1980 to 2001.   
Table 3 provides estimates of the abnormal return and percentage net present value for the 
whole sample and for each type of acquisition. The table reports that the average abnormal return 
for an acquisition is 1.103%. This abnormal return is significant at the 1% level. The median 
abnormal return is 0.364% and is also significant. Because almost all acquisitions involve the 
acquisition of a firm or subsidiary that is worth less than the acquiring firm, it is not surprising 
that the percentage net present value is larger than the abnormal return. For the whole sample, the 
average percentage net present value is 5.796%. This means that, on average, an acquisition 
increases shareholder wealth by $5.796 for each $100 spent. Finally, the aggregate net present 
                                                                                                                                                              
4 We also calculate abnormal returns by subtracting the value-weighted CRSP market return from the 
firm’s return. Our results are not sensitive to using either definition of abnormal returns.    9 
 
value of acquisitions is −$218.593 billion, so in total the shareholders of the acquiring firms in 
our sample lost substantially from 1980 to 2001 when acquisitions were announced.  
Since we saw in Table 1 that the number of acquisitions changes over time and is extremely 
large over the most recent acquisition wave, we have to be concerned about whether the results 
we obtain for the gains from acquisitions are due to the most recent acquisition wave. The answer 
is yes and no. There are only five years in our sample where the aggregate net present value of 
acquisitions is positive. These years are not clustered. They are 1982, 1984, 1993, 1995, and 
1996. If we stop our sample before the most recent merger wave the total dollar amount of gains 
from acquisitions is still negative, but the magnitude of losses until the end of 1993 is $10.421 
billion. Since 87.31% of the money spent on acquisitions in our sample is spent after 1993, it is 
perhaps not surprising that 95.23% of the losses occurred after 1993. Figure 1 shows the pattern 
over time of the yearly amount spent on acquisitions and of the yearly aggregate net present 
value. It is clear that the magnitudes of the last four years of the sample for amounts spent and 
aggregate net present values are very different from what they are for the other years.  
Table 3 shows estimates of the acquisition gains for each type of organizational form of 
acquired assets. The table shows dramatic differences in shareholder returns between acquisitions 
of assets organized as public firms on the one hand and assets organized as private firms or 
subsidiaries on the other hand. Zingales (1995) provides an analysis where the acquirer of a 
private firm or a subsidiary faces a different bargaining situation from the acquirer of a public 
firm. With the acquisition of a public firm, the free-rider problem identified by Grossman and 
Hart (1980) comes into play. It could therefore make sense that the shareholders of public firms 
would get a better deal when acquired than shareholders of private firms. Further, however, it 
may also be the case that with acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries, it is more often the 
case the owners of the entities wanted to sell them. This could be because the owners of the 
private firm wanted to exit or because the owner of the subsidiary had to raise funds. In such 
cases, the acquirer may benefit from providing a liquidity service.    10 
 
These arguments could explain why shareholders of a public firm acquiring a public firm 
gain less than when acquiring a private firm or a subsidiary. They cannot explain why, as Table 3 
shows, shareholders lose when an acquirer buys a public firm. The abnormal return is −1.020% 
and shareholders lose 5.9 cents per dollar spent on acquiring a public firm. The aggregate losses 
on acquisitions of public firms are $256.864 billion.  Acquisitions of public firms made an 
aggregate gain in only three years in our sample. In contrast, acquiring firm shareholders gain 
significantly for acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries. The most profitable acquisitions 
are those involving subsidiaries. When a firm acquires a subsidiary, the shareholders of the 
acquirer gain more than 10 cents per dollar spent on the acquisition. The shareholders of the 
acquiring firm earn 0.507% more if it acquires a subsidiary instead of a private firm and they earn 
2.516% more if it buys a private firm instead of a public firm. Even though acquisitions of private 
firms are profitable on average, shareholders lost in the aggregate from the announcement of such 
acquisitions. However, these losses are due to the most recent merger wave. Without it, 
acquisitions of private firms make an aggregate positive gain and such acquisitions make an 
aggregate positive gain in thirteen sample years. The only acquisition announcements from which 
shareholders gain in the aggregate over our whole sample period are acquisitions of subsidiaries. 
Acquisitions of subsidiaries make positive aggregate gains in thirteen sample years, but in 
addition they are extremely successful in 1998 and 1999.  
We saw in Table 2 that public firm acquirers are typically larger and more likely to pay with 
equity than private firm acquirers and subsidiaries. We know from earlier evidence that public 
firm acquisitions paid for with equity have lower abnormal returns than public firm acquisitions 
paid for with cash. Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) show that this result 
does not hold for private firm acquisitions in their samples and these acquisitions have significant 
positive abnormal returns when paid for with equity. Though earlier research does not examine 
acquisitions by small firms separately, such an examination is warranted here. We find that on 
average acquisitions are profitable, but in the aggregate they are not. A possible explanation for   11 
 
such a result is that large firms make large deals with large losses. There are a number of reasons 
why acquisitions by small firms might be more profitable than those by large firms. In particular, 
acquisitions by small firms are less likely to draw the attention of regulators and politicians. 
Small firms are more likely to be at the beginning of their lifecycle than large firms, so that the 
hubris emphasized by Roll (1986) as a possible explanation for poor bidder returns is less likely 
to be a factor. Agency costs of managerial discretion are also likely to be less for firms that have a 
smaller margin of error.  
In Table 4, we therefore split the sample according to the organizational form of the assets 
acquired, how the acquisition is paid for, and the size of the acquirer. We find first that the 
method used to pay for an acquisition of a private firm essentially does not matter for our sample. 
The abnormal return associated with the acquisition of a private firm is significantly positive 
regardless of how the acquisition is paid for and the abnormal returns for paying with equity are 
not significantly different from those for other payment methods. For the acquisition of public 
firms, the method of payment matters. Acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash have 
abnormal returns insignificantly different from zero, while those paid for with equity have 
significantly negative abnormal returns. Finally, for acquisitions of subsidiaries, it is rare for an 
acquisition to be paid for with equity alone, but these acquisitions are the most profitable for 
shareholders.  
We then turn to the relation between acquiring firm size and shareholder returns. For the 
whole sample, large firms have an insignificant abnormal return, while small firms have a 
significantly higher return. The difference in average abnormal return between small firms and 
other firms is 2.240%. Looking across organizational forms of target assets, this difference is 
smallest for acquisitions of private firms and largest for acquisitions of public firms. On average, 
shareholders of large firms acquiring public firms lose 1.696% when an acquisition is announced. 
In contrast, there is a significant gain when a small firm acquires a public firm.    12 
 
Could differences between the information environment of small firms and large firms 
explain why abnormal returns of acquisition announcements made by small firms are higher than 
those made by large firms? It is often argued that small firms are followed less closely by the 
press and analysts compared to other firms. Hence, it could be that announcements by smaller 
firms are less noticed. If this were the case, however, the abnormal returns of small firms should 
be insignificant. Consequently, this cannot explain our results since small firms have positive 
significant announcement returns. Alternatively, greater following of large firms could imply that 
announcements by large firms are less surprising. Since we find negative significant abnormal 
returns for large firms that make public acquisitions, the possible leakage of information means 
that if anything, we understate the adverse shareholder impact associated with the announcement 
of such acquisitions.  
Since method of payment differences between small firms and large firms could explain 
differences in abnormal returns, we show estimates of abnormal returns for small firms and large 
firms according to how acquisitions are paid for. We divide the acquisitions between acquisitions 
paid for with equity only, cash only, or a mix of cash, equity and other consideration. 
Acquisitions by large firms typically have low announcement returns regardless of the 
organizational form of the assets acquired and the way the acquisition is paid for, while 
acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries have systematically higher abnormal returns. 
Acquisitions by small firms have higher abnormal returns than those made by other firms, but 
even for small acquiring firms acquisitions of public firms paid for by equity do not have positive 
abnormal returns. Regardless of the type of acquisition, there is a significant difference in 
abnormal returns between small firms and large firms. The smallest difference is for acquisitions 
of private firms paid with cash, 0.699%, and the largest difference is for acquisitions of 
subsidiaries paid for with equity, 5.464%.  
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4. The impact of firm and deal characteristics. 
 
The abnormal return of acquisition announcements by small firms is significantly higher than 
the abnormal return of acquisition announcements by large firms. Further, though there are no 
significant differences between acquisitions of private firms and public firms for cash, there are 
differences among other types of acquisitions. Differences in abnormal returns between small and 
large firms or between public firm acquisitions with equity and private firm acquisitions with 
equity might be due to differences in firm or deal characteristics. To investigate whether this is 
the case, we run a regression of abnormal returns on dummy variables corresponding to each type 
of acquisition and on deal and firm characteristics. The deal and firm characteristics are the 
variables described in Table 2. Many of these variables have been shown to be correlated with 
abnormal returns for some types of acquisitions.  
In Table 5, regression (1) uses all the acquisitions for which we have data regardless of the 
type of acquisition. The most important result is that acquisitions by small firms have higher 
abnormal returns after controlling for firm and deal characteristics. Controlling for firm and deal 
characteristics, the abnormal return of an acquisition is 1.55% higher if it involves a small 
acquirer. In the regression, the intercept corresponds to acquisitions of subsidiaries. Acquisitions 
of private firms and public firms have significantly lower abnormal returns than acquisitions of 
subsidiaries. Whether an acquisition is financed by equity is not correlated with abnormal returns 
when the whole sample is used. However, cash acquisitions have significantly lower abnormal 
returns.  
Since Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983), the literature generally emphasizes the 
importance of the size of the target relative to the size of the acquirer when considering 
acquisitions of public firms and finds that bidder returns are positively related to the relative size 
of the target. Since the relative size variable falls as bidder size increases, it follows that bidder   14 
 
returns are negatively related to bidder size.
5 Regression (1) uses that variable as an explanatory 
variable. This variable has a coefficient of 0.0117 that is significant. The dummy variable for 
small firms is significant when we control for the value of the target relative to the value of the 
acquirer, so that the size effect we document is not the relative size effect documented in the 
literature. Looking at the economic significance of the two effects, across types of acquisitions, if 
an acquisition represents 30% of the market capitalization of the acquirer instead of 10%, the 
abnormal return increases by roughly 0.23%. In contrast, if an acquisition is made by a small firm 
instead of a large one, the abnormal return increases by 1.55%. The small firm effect in 
acquisition returns is therefore much larger than the relative size effect in our regression. 
In regression (1), conglomerate acquisitions have lower abnormal returns, but the coefficient 
on the dummy variable that takes value one if an acquisition is in a different 2-digit industry SIC 
code is small and insignificant. Acquiring firm shareholders gain more with tender offers. Almost 
all tender offers are acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash. Consequently, an acquisition 
of a public firm paid for with cash through a tender offer has a higher abnormal return than an 
acquisition of a public firm paid for with equity in a merger. Our proxy for q has a negative 
significant coefficient, but the size of the coefficient means that the effect is economically trivial. 
Further, the significance of the coefficient is due to the firms with extremely large q values. If we 
truncate q at 4, the coefficient is not significant. Acquisitions in industries with more merger and 
acquisition activity, i.e., industries with a high liquidity index, have a lower abnormal return. 
                                                      
5 Schwert (2000) finds a positive coefficient on bidder size when examining cumulative abnormal returns 
from day 63 before the announcement to day 126 after the announcement. His abnormal returns are market 
model abnormal returns assuming an intercept of zero. He interprets this coefficient as inconsistent with 
Roll’s hubris hypothesis. The average bidder size in Schwert (2000) is much higher than in our study. 
Using our sample until 1996, our abnormal returns, and Schwert’s (2000) explanatory variables (using only 
SDC information for hostility), we find that the coefficient on bidder size becomes positive, but 
insignificant, when we eliminate firms with assets below $250 million. Since his sample period starts in 
1976 and since he includes unsuccessful offers, our sample is not the same as his. However, as we use a 
sample more similar to his, we seem to find a result more consistent with his. In contrast, Asquith, Bruner, 
and Mullins (1983) compute abnormal returns from day 20 before the announcement to the announcement. 
Our study is focused directly on announcement returns, but we examine long-term returns in Section 5. 
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Potential competition therefore lowers returns to acquiring firm shareholders. Finally, leverage is 
not significant.  
The next three regressions estimate the same regression but for each organizational form of 
acquired assets separately. This allows us to identify how different ways of paying for the 
acquisition are correlated with the abnormal returns depending on the organizational form. 
Regression (2) uses only the acquisitions of private firms in the sample. The intercept 
corresponds to the acquisitions with mixed financing. How a private firm acquisition is financed 
does not matter after controlling for deal and firm characteristics. Small firms again have 
significantly higher abnormal returns even when relative transaction value is controlled for.   
Except for the relative size of the transaction and our q proxy, other variables are insignificant. 
Similar results are obtained for subsidiaries, except that the abnormal return is significantly lower 
for conglomerate acquisitions and significantly lower for acquisitions in industries with greater 
merger and acquisition activity. Again, relatively larger transactions have higher abnormal 
returns.  
Regression (4) uses only the public firm acquisitions. The significant variables are the 
dummy variable for equity financing, the small firm dummy variable, and leverage. The 
magnitude of the small firm dummy variable is more than twice the magnitude of the equity 
financing dummy variable in absolute value. As a result, an equity-financed acquisition by a 
small firm has a higher abnormal return than a cash-financed acquisition by a large firm, keeping 
the other variables unchanged. In a recent paper, Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2002) 
show that bidder abnormal returns are positively related to equity book-to-market and to the ratio 
of an estimate of fundamental share value to share price. They argue that these measures proxy 
for firm overvaluation and more overvalued acquirers have lower returns. Our q proxy should be 
negatively related to their measures, but we do not find a similar result. Possible explanations for 
this might be that their sample is larger than our sample of public firm acquisitions, mostly   16 
 
because they include more acquisitions than we do, or that q is an imperfect substitute for equity 
market-to-book.    
The last three regressions of the table use sub-samples of acquisitions financed in the same 
way to estimate the difference in abnormal returns that can be explained by the organizational 
form of the assets acquired keeping everything else constant. Regression (5) uses all acquisitions 
with mixed financing. Acquisitions of public firms have significantly lower abnormal returns. As 
in the other regressions, the size dummy is significant. Further, the conglomerate dummy has a 
negative significant coefficient. When we turn to regression (6) that uses acquisitions financed 
with equity only, the results are similar except that the conglomerate dummy has a positive 
significant coefficient. The abnormal return of public acquisitions is lower by 4.37%. Finally, for 
cash acquisitions, the abnormal returns are insignificantly different across types of acquisitions. 
The conglomerate dummy and competed offer dummy are both negative and significant. 
Furthermore, the abnormal return falls with q and with the liquidity index.  
An obvious concern about the results of Table 5 is that they may be explained by the most 
recent acquisition wave. We examined the robustness of the results of Table 5 to insure that our 
inferences hold up when we control for year and industry effects. Adding dummy variables for 2-
digit SIC code major industry classification for targets and acquirers, as well as year dummies, 
we still find the same key results. In particular, the impact of size remains unaffected.  
From the evidence of Table 5, once we control for deal and firm characteristics, the way an 
acquisition is financed matters only if a public firm is acquired. In Table 4, the difference 
between an equity-financed acquisition of a private firm and an equity-financed acquisition of a 
public firm is 3.511%. The difference in abnormal return between a cash acquisition of a private 
firm and a cash acquisition of a public firm is 0.848%. Consequently, the difference in abnormal 
returns between acquisitions of private firms and public firms is increased by 2.663% when 
equity is used to pay for the acquisition instead of cash. Table 5 confirms that this difference is 
due to the adverse effect on the announcement return of using equity to pay for public firm   17 
 
acquisitions rather than to a potential benefit of paying with equity for private firm acquisitions. 
There is no significant benefit from using equity for private firm acquisitions in regression (2), 
while there is a significant disadvantage in using equity for public firm acquisitions in regression 
(4).  
Why is it that public acquisitions have lower abnormal returns, especially when they are paid 
for with equity? First, it is important to notice that cash acquisitions of public firms by small 
acquirers actually have larger abnormal returns than acquisitions by small acquirers of private 
firms paid for with cash or equity. Consequently, the poor results of acquisitions of public firms 
are due to equity acquisitions and acquisitions made by large firms. Recently, Mitchell, Pulvino, 
and Stafford (2002) provide evidence that some of the lower abnormal return associated with 
equity-financed acquisitions of public firms is due to the activities of arbitrageurs who sell the 
stock of the bidder to hedge long positions in the target. This effect should increase with the 
relative size of the acquisition. However, so could price pressure resulting from the increase in 
the bidder’s equity. We estimated a regression for equity-financed acquisitions of public firms 
where we allow the abnormal return to be related to the value of the acquisition relative to the 
value of the equity of the acquirer. As the value of the acquisition increases, everything else 
equal, arbitrageurs would sell a larger fraction of the firm’s equity, thereby decreasing the 
acquirer’s stock price further. As expected, we find a negative coefficient on that variable, but the 
coefficient is small and insignificant. However, when we estimate the regression for large firms 
only (not reported), the results become stronger and the coefficient on the relevant variable 
becomes large and significant. An acquisition that is greater by 10% of the acquiring firm’s 
equity capitalization has a lower abnormal return of 0.6%. Our evidence is consistent with the 
existence of an arbitrageur effect or a more general price pressure effect for large firms but not 
small firms. It seems difficult to believe that price pressure effects due to the increase of the 
supply of shares would exist for large firms but not small ones; however, it is reasonable to 
expect that arbitrageurs will be more active if the bidder is a large firm. Since small firms perform   18 
 
better when they announce an acquisition of a public firm financed by equity, the lack of an 
arbitrageur effect could help explain this better performance.  
An explanation often advanced for the negative abnormal returns associated with equity-
financed offers relies on the Myers and Majluf (1984) model of equity issues. Following this 
model a firm would not pay with equity if management believes that the firm’s equity is 
undervalued, and hence, when an equity-financed offer is made investors infer that management 
believes that the firm’s equity is overvalued. Empirical evidence shows that public equity issues 
have negative announcement returns.
6 Our evidence makes this interpretation of the negative 
abnormal returns associated with the announcement of acquisitions of public firms financed with 
equity not completely satisfactory because acquisitions of public firms by small firms have a 
negative abnormal return that is much smaller than the typical negative abnormal return 
associated with equity issues. Existing evidence on equity issues does not show a negative 
relation between firm size and the abnormal return.
7 We cannot exclude, however, that the 
abnormal return associated with an equity-financed acquisition of a public firm is roughly equal 
to the abnormal return associated with a cash-financed acquisition plus the abnormal return 
associated with an equity issue. However, if that were the case, acquisitions of public firms would 
decrease shareholder wealth for large firms since their acquisitions have a significant negative 
abnormal return.  
Investors do not learn the same adverse information when a firm pays for the acquisition of a 
private firm or a subsidiary with equity. An acquisition of a public firm paid for with equity 
involves the equivalent of a public issue of equity since typically public companies have diffuse 
ownership. In contrast, an acquisition of a private firm paid for with equity is more similar to a 
private equity issue, since private companies have concentrated ownership. Empirical evidence 
                                                      
6 See Eckbo and Masulis (1995) for a review article.  
7 Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) run a regression of abnormal returns of equity issues on various variables 
including total assets. The coefficient on total assets is positive but not significant.  
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shows that private equity issues have positive announcement returns in contrast to public equity 
issues. One explanation of these positive announcement returns is Wruck (1989) who argues that 
a private equity issue results in the creation of a large shareholder who can increase firm value 
through monitoring. Alternatively, Hertzel and Smith (1993) propose that investors who buy in a 
private equity issue can obtain information from the firm that diffuse and anonymous investors 
cannot, so that the potential for an equity issue to reveal adverse information is mitigated. On 
average, therefore, we would expect no penalty for paying with equity in the acquisition of a 
private firm. We investigate whether monitoring by the new equity holders plays a role in 
explaining the abnormal returns associated with acquisitions of private firms paid for with equity 
as argued by Fuller et al. (2002) for their sample of repeat acquirers. Monitoring matters more if 
the block created through the acquisition is larger relative to the firm’s existing equity. In 
regression (2) in Table 5, we find that the abnormal return increases with the relative size. 
However, when we estimate regression (2) only for acquisitions financed with equity (not 
reported), the abnormal return increases less with the relative size of the acquisition than in 
regression (2). This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the benefit of monitoring increases 
with the size of the block. When we restrict the regression to large firms (not reported), however, 
we find a result that is more supportive of the monitoring hypothesis.   
Fuller et al. (2002) raise the possibility that acquisitions of public firms could be less 
profitable because the market for public firms is more liquid, so that competition reduces the 
gains from acquisitions. In our regressions, we control for one form of liquidity, namely the 
intensity of mergers and acquisitions in the industry of the target. This proxy for liquidity is 
significant, but it cannot explain the worse abnormal returns for acquisitions of public firms. 
Explicit competition in the form of multiple bidders cannot explain the worse abnormal returns 
either.  
We investigate further whether proxies for agency costs explain the cross-sectional variation 
in abnormal returns. Firms with poor growth opportunities are more likely to make poor   20 
 
investments if the agency costs of managerial discretion are high. For the whole sample, low q 
firms (firms defined as firms with a q below one) do not have worse abnormal returns. However, 
when we consider separately the sample of large firms, we find that firms with q less than one 
have lower abnormal returns. This is especially the case for cash acquisitions. These acquisitions 
have abnormal returns lower by 0.87% when undertaken by low q firms. We also find that 
diversifying cash acquisitions by large firms have abnormal returns lower by 0.40%. However, 
the Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) measure of free cash flow (cash flow if q is lower than one) 
is not significant.  
 
5. Post-event stock price performance. 
There has been increasing concern in the literature that announcement returns may not be 
capturing the whole shareholder wealth impact of a corporate action. If that is the case, it is 
possible that announcement returns incorporate information differently across firm characteristics 
and deal types. Hence, the differences we document across firms characteristics and deal types 
might be artificial results due to the fact that markets are not equally efficient for all stocks. This 
concern would have some validity if we were to find out that the differences we document at 
announcement get reversed over time. To address this issue, we examine long-term returns 
following announcements.    
Some of the existing studies that examine long-term returns following acquisitions of public 
firms suggest that shareholders fare poorly following acquisitions paid for with equity (for 
instance, Loughran and Vijh (1997)), but other studies do not find poor returns following such 
acquisitions (for instance, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and 
Teoh (2002)). One reason why studies reach different conclusions when estimating long-term 
returns is that the return estimates are sensitive to the estimation method. There is a lively debate 
in the literature concerning which approach is better (see Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1997)). Some authors favor an examination of returns in event time, while others prefer to   21 
 
consider the returns in calendar time of portfolios of firms that have experienced the event of 
interest. Rather than choosing one approach, we report results using both a calendar-time and an 
event-time analysis. For the calendar-time analysis we measure long-term stock price 
performance using a portfolio method similar to the one proposed by Jaffe (1974), Mandelker 
(1974), and Fama (1998). For each calendar month we form an equally weighted portfolio of the 
firms that made an acquisition in the past 3 years, measured relative to the completion date of the 
transaction, provided that there are at least ten such firms. The time-series of portfolio returns net 
of the risk-free return over the sample period is regressed on the four factors from the Fama and 
French (1992, 1993) and Carhart (1997) models (i.e., market return net of risk-free return, HML, 
BMS, and Momentum) as in Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002). The intercept reflects the 
average monthly abnormal return for the sample. We examine long-term returns for sub-samples 
selected according to firm size, target organizational form, and form of payment. For each 
subsample, we form a portfolio that investors could have invested in. The difference between 
small and large acquirers' abnormal returns is calculated using a time-series of the difference 
between a long position in the small acquirer portfolio and a simultaneous short position in the 
large acquirer portfolio. If either portfolio does not have a return in a given calendar month then 
the time-series observation is deleted from the regression. 
In Table 6 we report the post-event long-term results for the whole sample and the various 
sub-samples. Typically, studies using the calendar-time portfolio approach are less likely to find 
long-term abnormal returns. Table 6 is not surprising in this context. For the whole sample, the 
monthly abnormal return is -0.041% and insignificant. There is therefore no evidence that 
acquirers have poor long-term performance. This is what one would expect in an efficient market. 
Very few sub-samples have significant long-term returns. We find that private firm acquisitions 
by large firms have positive long-term abnormal returns, while private firm acquisitions by small 
firms have negative long-term abnormal returns. The difference between these abnormal returns 
is significant. Acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash have significant positive abnormal   22 
 
returns. We find no evidence that firms paying with equity have poor long-term returns in our 
sample. The differences in returns across organizational forms are trivial.    
We also estimate long-term returns using event-time analysis and calculate three-year buy-
and-hold abnormal returns, following the approach of Barber and Lyon (1997). For each sample 
firm we find a matching firm based on the closest monthly market value of assets within the same 
yearly equity book-to-market quintile measured one month after the completion of the 
transaction. Sample firms are excluded from the matching population during a six-year window 
around the completion month. Furthermore, matching firms exclude ADR's, closed-end funds, 
and REIT's. Abnormal buy-and-hold returns are defined as the difference between the buy-and-
hold return of the sample firm and the buy-and-hold return of the matching firm. 
Estimates of long-term abnormal returns in event time tend to be larger than those obtained 
using the portfolio approach. This happens, for instance, if the worst long-term abnormal returns 
take place when the frequency of events is highest. In this case, portfolio returns weight equally 
months in which the portfolio has many firms that perform poorly and months in which it has few 
firms that perform less poorly. In contrast, the event time approach weighs each firm equally. 
Table 7 shows our estimates in the same format as Table 6. We find there that acquiring firms 
perform poorly. There is not much of a difference between large and small firms, but firms that 
acquire private firms have the worst long-term abnormal returns. For firms that acquire private 
firms, there is not much of a difference between large and small firms and between the form of 
payment. However, when we turn to firms that acquire public firms, large firms perform worse 
and there is no evidence that firms paying cash have negative long-term abnormal returns.  
Long-term abnormal returns would be a source of concern if taking into account these returns 
would change the conclusions we draw from the announcement returns. In that case, one might 
possibly argue that the market fails to take fully into account the impact of the acquisitions for 
shareholder wealth. There is no consistent pattern of this happening. With portfolio returns, there 
is no evidence of significant abnormal returns for all acquirers and sub-samples based on firm   23 
 
size, organizational form of target, and means of payment. The only puzzling evidence is that 
large firms making acquisitions of private firms perform better than small firms making 
acquisitions of private firms. Small firms making acquisitions of private firms have marginally 
significant negative abnormal returns. The evidence using the event-time approach does not lead 
to the same conclusion. With that evidence differences between small and large firms are never 
significant and acquiring firms perform poorly. It seems reasonable to conclude that the evidence 
on long-term returns does not suggest that inferences from announcement returns are not reliable.     
 
6. Conclusion 
Acquisitions announcements are associated with a decrease in aggregate shareholder wealth. 
This is true whether we include the latest acquisition wave or not, but the latest acquisition wave 
is associated with extremely large losses of shareholder wealth, so including that wave in our 
estimates leads to extremely large aggregate losses in shareholder wealth when acquisitions are 
announced. However, the losses in shareholder wealth are caused by acquisitions by large firms. 
If we consider only acquisitions by small firms, shareholders gain in the aggregate.  
When looking at percentage abnormal returns, the most important variable in explaining the 
cross-sectional variation across acquisitions seems to be whether an acquisition is made by a large 
or a small firm. Though acquisitions of public firms have worse abnormal returns on average, this 
result is due to large firms and equity acquisitions. Cash acquisitions of public firms by small 
firms have significant positive abnormal returns insignificantly different from cash acquisitions of 
private firms by the same firms.  
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems in large firms lead them 
to make poor acquisitions. It is also possible, however, that large firms that make acquisitions are 
the firms that signal that they have exhausted internal growth opportunities, so that firm value 
drops as a result of that signal rather than because of the acquisition. Further work is required to 
explain why large firms make poor acquisitions in general and why they make acquisitions that   24 
 
are associated with such dramatic reductions in shareholder wealth during the most recent merger 
wave. Our result that large firms make poor acquisitions when the acquisitions are evaluated 
using announcement abnormal returns shows that acquisition abnormal returns are poorly suited 
to analyses of the social benefits of acquisitions. Because so many acquisitions are made by small 
firms, abnormal returns can be positive for acquisitions even though acquisitions appear to 
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Figure 1: Yearly Aggregate Transaction Values and Net Present Values 
In Panel A, the transaction values are from SDC U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The graph show 
the aggregated amounts spent by public firms on acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and 
subsidiaries for acquisitions in excess of $1 million. In Panel B, the net present values correspond to the 
sum of the product of the fractional abnormal return of each announcement multiplied by the equity 
capitalization of the acquirer. 
 
 



































































 Table 1 
Sample Distribution Sorted by Announcement Year 
Number of observations in the sample of successful acquirers for the period 1980-2001. Acquirers are 
domestic publicly listed firms and are collected from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Targets 
include domestic private firms, public firms, and subsidiaries. 
 
Announcement Target  Organizational Form   
Year Private  Public  Subsidiary  All 
1980  6 14 2 22 
1981  37 50 26  113 
1982  43 58 48  149 
1983 61  49  104 214 
1984 90  82  109 281 
1985  25 72 60  157 
1986  86 70 89  245 
1987  75 74 67  216 
1988  59 75 91  225 
1989 101  68  135  304 
1990 97  48  111 256 
1991 131  54  119  304 
1992 223  72  180  475 
1993 297  90  246  633 
1994  397 151 256 804 
1995  422 198 276 896 
1996  532 218 326  1,076 
1997  796 285 436  1,517 
1998  795 277 436  1,508 
1999  572 264 279  1,115 
2000  462 214 209 885 
2001  276 159 193 628 
All  5,583 2,642 3,798  12,023 




Summary Statistics Sorted by Organizational Form 
The transaction value ($ million) is the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and 
expenses. The number of days to completion is measured as the number of days between the announcement 
and effective dates. The liquidity index for the target is calculated as the value of corporate control 
transactions for each year and two-digit SIC code divided by the total book value of assets of firms in the 
two-digit SIC code for that year. Conglomerate deals involve targets with a 2-digit SIC code other than that 
of the bidder. Small acquirers have a market capitalization equal or less than the market capitalization of 
the smallest quartile of NYSE firms in each year. Cash includes cash and marketable. Median values are in 
brackets. 
 
 Private  Public  Subsidiary  All 
 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
 
Transaction value (TV)  57.2  836.4  149.8  257.7 
 [17.5]  [126.9]  [35.0]  [31.0] 
        
TV/ Assets  0.210  0.303  0.226  0.236 
 [0.070]  [0.134]  [0.086]  [0.085] 
        
Days to completion  60  149  67  81 
 [28]  [133]  [42]  [52] 
        
Liquidity index for target  0.132  0.072  0.107  0.111 
 [0.059]  [0.032]  [0.046]  [0.047] 
        
Cash in payment (%)  50.56  29.57  75.92  53.96 
        
Equity in payment (%)  36.87  55.32  9.36  32.23 
        
Pure cash deals (%)  36.90  14.99  63.35  40.44 
        
Pure equity deals (%)  27.82  45.38  5.42  24.60 
        
Tender-offers (%)  0.18  17.22  0.24  3.94 
        
Hostile deals (%)  0.02  1.97  0.05  0.46 
        
Conglomerate deals (%)  44.81  33.42  43.71  41.96 
        
Competed deals (%)  0.23  4.47  0.39  1.21 
 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
 
Cash / Assets (book)   0.180  0.133  0.124  0.152 
 [0.085]  [0.064]  [0.052]  [0.068] 
        
Assets (book)  963.9  6,757.9  2,121.8  2,602.9 
 [170.9]  [1,343.0]  [312.7]  [302.2] 
        
Market Capitalization  793.9  4,206.2  1,315.4  1,708.5 
 [191.3]  [703.4]  [259.2]  [263.2] 
        
Debt / Assets (book)  0.441  0.472  0.505  0.469 
 [0.412]  [0.476]  [0.499]  [0.455] 
        
Debt / Assets (market)  0.279  0.322  0.364  0.316 
 [0.234]  [0.294]  [0.348]  [0.286] 
        
Tobin’s q   2.263  1.581  1.579  1.897 
 [1.360]  [0.957]  [1.203]  [1.222] 
        
OCF / Assets (book)  0.133  0.530  0.190  0.241 
 [0.100]  [0.144]  [0.139]  [0.123] 
        
Small Acquirer (%)  55.40  25.78  45.52  45.77 
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Table 3 
Announcement Abnormal Returns and Market Adjusted Present Values 
Sorted by Organizational Form 
Each row includes the mean [median] 3-day cumulative abnormal return (in percent) and is measured using 
the market model. This is followed by the mean [median] market-adjusted net present value, calculated as 
the firm's price two days before the announcement times the number of shares outstanding times the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return divided by the total transaction value reported by SDC. $NPV (in $ millions) 
denotes the dollar sum of value created. The final row for each sub-group lists the number of observations. 
Equality tests are based on t-tests for equality of the means and a Wilcoxon test for equality of medians. 
 
 All  Private  Public  Subsidiary  Difference  Tests 
































         
$NPV -$218,593  -$7,130  -$256,864  $45,401       
        
N 12,023 
 
5,583 2,642 3,798     
 
a Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
c Denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 




Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Sorted by Organizational Form, Form of Payment, and Size 
Each row includes the mean 3-day cumulative abnormal return (in percent) measured using the market 
model. Small acquirers have a market capitalization equal or less than the market capitalization of the 
smallest quartile of NYSE firms in each year. The groups mixed, equity, and cash, are defined as 
transactions with a mix of cash, equity and other considerations, all equity, and all cash respectively. The 




Panel A: Full Sample  
 
 Mixed  Equity  Cash  All  Difference  Tests 







 4,203  2,958  4,862  12,023       





a 0.594 -0.146 0.448 
  2,152 1,103 2,248 5,503       
        







  2,051 1,855 2,614 6,520       
        
Difference  2.389
a 2.989 1.475 2.240
a     
 






a 0.310 0.278 0.588
b 
  1,970 1,553 2,060 5,583       








  1,242 700 1,152  3,093       
        




a 0.289 -0.324 -0.035 
 728  853  909  2,490       





a      
 









 1,047  1,199  396  2,642      








  288  298 95 681       
        








 759  901  301  1,961       





a      
 









  1,186 206 2,406  3,798       







 622  105  1,002  1,729       
        






 564  101  1,404  2,069       





a     
 
a Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level. 




Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Announcement Abnormal Returns 
by Organizational Form and Form of Payment 
The dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return measured using the market model. Small 
acquirers have a market capitalization equal or less than the market capitalization of the smallest quartile of 
NYSE firms in each year. The groups, mixed, equity, and cash, are defined as transactions with a mix of 
cash, equity and other considerations, all equity, and all cash respectively. Significance is based on White-
adjusted standard errors. P-values are reported below the coefficients. 
 
    Organizational Form  Form of Payment 
  All Private  Subs  Public  Mixed  Equity  Cash 








  0.000 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.311 0.000 
         
Private -0.0043
c      -0.0053  -0.0051  -0.0037 
  0.050      0.194  0.672  0.115 
         
Public -0.0317
a      -0.0283
a -0.0437
a -0.0095 
  0.000      0.000  0.000  0.199 









  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
         





  0.140 0.463 0.014 0.421 0.032 0.058 0.075 
         
Tender-offer 0.0135
a -0.0102 -0.023
a 0.006 0.0041 0.0156  -0.0018 
  0.003 0.655 0.001 0.225 0.525 0.281 0.839 
         
Hostile  -0.0115    -0.0082 -0.0171 -0.0198 -0.0103 
  0.200      0.388 0.194 0.503 0.381 
         
Competed  -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0071 0.0197 -0.0191
c 
  0.389 0.626 0.863 0.528 0.486 0.263 0.061 
         
All Equity  -0.0022  0.0035  0.0005  -0.0148
a      
  0.464 0.386 0.965 0.002     
         
All Cash  -0.0039
c -0.004 -0.0045 0.0066       
  0.057 0.185 0.181 0.210     
         







  0.000 0.003 0.000 0.528 0.002 0.061 0.000 
         
Tobin’s q  -0.0007
c -0.0009
b 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0013
c 
  0.083 0.016 0.670 0.918 0.238 0.300 0.096 
         
Leverage  (mkt.)  0.0012 -0.0035 -0.004 0.0296
b -0.0054 0.0034 -0.0028 
  0.832 0.660 0.710 0.028 0.593 0.828 0.707 
         
Liquidity Index  -0.0125
a -0.0069 -0.0163
a -0.011 -0.0065 -0.0156  -0.0112
a 
  0.002 0.220 0.006 0.449 0.488 0.326 0.005 
         
Op. Cash Flow  0.0001  0.0049  -0.0003  0.0001  -0.0024  -0.0002  0.0001 
  0.849 0.145 0.579 0.935 0.111 0.920 0.543 
         
n  9,219 4,349 3,231 1,639 3,392 1,798 4,029 
Adjusted R
2
  0.053 0.035 0.066 0.054 0.059 0.063 0.068 
 
a Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
b Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
c Denotes significance at the 10% level.  
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